A Study on the Impact of Multiple Large Shareholders on Management's Tone Manipulation
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.62051/vfj0na80Keywords:
Multiple large shareholders; managers' tone manipulation; corporate governance.Abstract
This study takes A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2012 to 2023 as the research objects, and empirically tests the impact of multiple large shareholders on managers' tone manipulation behavior. The research finds that the ownership structure with multiple large shareholders can inhibit managers' tone manipulation. Mechanism tests show that multiple large shareholders reduce managers' tone manipulation behavior by alleviating financing constraints. Further research reveals that the inhibitory effect of multiple large shareholders on managers' tone manipulation is more significant in enterprises with low internal governance levels. The above research conclusions have important theoretical and practical significance for how to restrict managers' tone manipulation, and also provide new evidence for large shareholders to participate in corporate governance.
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